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1
 Topcased (Toolkit in open-source for critical application and systems development) is a project of the French 
Competitivity Cluster Aerospace Valley. It addresses process and tool support to model-based engineering and 
validation of critical embedded systems [5: http://www.topcased.org] 
Abstract: Model Driven Engineering approaches are 
widely promoted to overcome difficulties to design, 
validate and maintain large complex systems. They 
present interesting dependability characteristics 
especially in terms of prevention of design faults and 
validation of design correctness. However industrial 
needs, practices and applicable standards impose 
constraints on the dependability activities to perform 
and justify. Therefore it is necessary to analyze how 
a complete dependability and safety process can be 
integrated with model-driven approaches within a 
seamless global process: which dependability 
activities are naturally covered or facilitated by 
model-driven approaches, and which additional 
activities are needed with which support. 
This paper presents the results of a study aiming at 
the establishment of requirements to model-driven 
engineering methods and tools, to support 
dependability analyses. 
Keywords: Model-driven engineering, dependability 
1. Introduction 
This document presents a synthesis of the work 
conducted within the Topcased1 project, with focus 
on selected application case studies. The objectives 
were to manage the discussion and assessment of 
main issues to get efficient support to dependability 
analyses within a model-based engineering 
framework. They address the main following points: 
• Identification and classification of the relevant 
dependability concepts, attributes and links, 
Identification of dependability analysis methods 
and tools; 
• Organisation of the dependability and safety 
process, activities, inputs and outputs and 
mapping to life cycle and model-based 
engineering entities, especially identifying the 
interactions between dependability and design; 
• Illustration of the proposed approach on two 
complementary examples: 
o Association of failure modes and failure 
rates to design model entities, to support 
through model transformation the 
elaboration of dependability models for 
quantitative evaluation, 
o Representation of partitions (with respect to 
faults and failures) on design models, to 
support fault dependency or independency 
analyses (e.g., criticality level allocation, 
common cause analysis, etc.); 
• Discussion of current limitations (concepts, 
methods, tools) and proposals. 
2. Dependability engineering 
2.1 Background 
Dependability, defined as the ability to deliver 
service that can justifiably be trusted [1] 
encompasses properties such as reliability 
(continuity of correct service), availability (readiness 
for correct service) etc. Dependability engineering, 
including validation, consists in ensuring the required 
dependability properties taking into account possible 
threats (faults, errors and failures). 
Faults, errors and failures are not “atomic” concepts. 
Detailed dependability analyses lead to distinguish 
permanent, intermittent and transient faults, or 
dormant and active faults (corresponding to a state 
where a given fault causes or does not cause 
errors), leading to the notion of fault dormancy. In 
the same way, errors may be detected or not 
detected, leading to the notion of error latency. 
Failures may be characterised by their occurrence 
process (e.g., failure rate), and by the distinction 
between several failure modes. Failure modes may 
be themselves further characterised by their severity, 
leading to the notion of severity level, associated to 
the allocation of levels to entities according to the 
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maximum severity of their potential failures: 
development assurance level, safety integrity level, 
software criticality. 
 
2.2 Dependability Analyses: Needs and Objectives 
Dependability engineering encompasses the set of 
activities intended to: 
• Provide the system with the required 
dependability properties; 
• Ensure that the system actually fulfils its 
required properties. 
These two categories are in practice tightly coupled 
in an iterative process where solutions are 
progressively analysed and evaluated thanks to 
dependability analysis methods. 
In industrial practice and applicable standards, we 
can distinguish the following four categories of 
dependability analyses: 
• Criticality analysis: 
The objectives are to identify and allocate 
“criticality categories” to design entities 
(functions, hardware or software elements) 
reflecting the level of trust we must have on 
these entities (and therefore the level required 
for their design and validation). 
• Dependency analysis (common cause analysis): 
The objectives are to evaluate to which extent 
some design entities are independent with 
respect to failures i.e., to which extent we can 
assume that two considered failures are 
stochastically independent events. Conversely 
the approach may focus on the identification of 
common causes: either a potential source of 
failure propagating to two design entities 
expected to fail independently (redundancies) or 
a potential (undesired) path through which the 
failure of an entity may propagate and cause the 
failure of another expected independent entity. 
• Quantitative dependability analysis: 
The objectives are to provide an estimation of a 
quantitative dependability property (reliability, 
availability, error latency, coverage factor, etc.). 
This can be achieved through experimental (fault 
injection, field data collection) or analytical 
(modelling) techniques, based on a set of 
assumptions on the stochastic characteristics of 
the fault occurrence and propagation processes 
(see next point below). 
• Fault propagation analysis: 
The objectives are to characterize the process of 
propagation of faults and failures, in particular to 
assess whether the various fault tolerance and 
error detection mechanisms are sufficient or 
where additional ones are needed. Fault 
propagation analyses may be top-down (e.g., 
fault-tree analysis) or bottom-up (e.g., failure 
modes, effects and criticality analysis) (or even 
both such as HAZOP – Hazard and Operability 
analysis). It is worth noting that this fourth 
category is not exactly of the same nature of the 
previous three ones, in the sense that in addition 
to its own objectives as identified above, fault 
propagation analysis can also, and generally is, 
used as a support to perform criticality, 
dependency or quantitative analysis. 
In addition, a particular category of dependability 
analysis approaches is constituted by the analysis of 
the behaviour of fault tolerance mechanisms. It is 
similar by nature to analysis methods in support to 
the general engineering process. However their 
application to mechanisms (or elements, 
subsystems, procedures etc.) dedicated to 
dependability, leads to highlight here their important 
contribution as a dependability assessment means. 
Their objectives are to analyse and characterize the 
functional properties of the fault tolerance 
mechanisms. This may be used to validate that they 
fulfil their requirements, or as a support to other 
dependability analysis methods (e.g., to evaluate 
quantitative parameters such as error latency). 
2.3. Dependability methods and tools 
As mentioned previously, the fault propagation 
analysis is the kernel of any dependability analysis. It 
can be done by using experimental techniques on 
actual devices (e.g. fault injection in a hardware 
components) or by building some analytical models 
and then analyzing the models. In this section, we 
focus on the second approach. For sake of clarity, 
we try to separate concerns, presenting on the one 
hand the features of usual analytical models and on 
the other hand, the kind of computations that enable 
to exploit these models. 
The analytical dependability models depict how 
faults are propagated or confined inside the system. 
They catch causality chains between dependability 
concepts (how faults cause errors and then failures). 
Fault tree, FMEA and all system models that 
describe how a system reacts when a fault occurs 
can be considered as analytical dependability 
models. In the following, some features of these 
models are highlighted in order to understand their 
commonalities and differences.  
Models may have different scopes. They can be 
centred on a specific failure and forget all faults and 
errors that are not related to the studied failure. This 
approach is usually taken when designing fault-tree 
or reliability blocks models. Conversely, they can be 
“system centred” and gather in one model all 
causality chains of interest for this system. This 
approach is for example taken when injecting 
failures in a software model.  
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Models may encode fault propagation in different 
ways. A model may consist in an explicit set of fault 
propagation paths. For instance, traditional fault 
trees usually encode dependencies between 
observable failures or between failures and primary 
faults by and/or gates. More details about the meta-
models of fault-tree can be found for instance in [3]. 
Conversely, a fault propagation may be modelled in 
a more compositional and implicit way. In such 
cases, the model consists in interconnected basic 
blocks of the system. Each basic block model 
depicts explicitly how the basic component may be 
faulty and propagate (or not) faulty inputs. The global 
propagation paths are left implicit and result from the 
composition rules of the basic components. 
Finally, the models can be specifically built for 
dependability analyses or may be reused and 
extended to cope with failure propagation. For 
instance, one may intend to reuse an AADL model 
that depicts the software architecture of a system. 
Then the model can be extended in order to describe 
the effects of a failure of each piece of the software 
architecture. Finally, we have to compile this 
extended model into a format that better support the 
safety analysis. For instance, the extended AADL 
model can be compiled in an AltaRica model [3]. 
The kinds of computation that enable to use such 
models for dependability analysis rely on at least 
four general mechanisms: 
• Analysis of failure propagation paths: 
o bottom-up analysis: effect of one fault on the 
system 
o top-down analysis: search of faults leading 
to a feared event; 
• Quantification of the probability of occurrence of 
some events; 
• Verification of the validity of some hypotheses or 
requirements about a system or component 
design. 
Whatever the way for building models, the tools that 
implement these mechanisms operate on mainly two 
kinds of low level formats that encode causality 
chains: 
• Boolean formulae when static view of causality 
is sufficient; 
• Automata when reasoning about system 
dynamic is necessary. 
Then the search of causes or effects of some events 
will turn out to compute either causes/consequences 
of formulae or exploring the system state space. 
For instance, Aralia is a tool used to deal with fault 
trees i.e. Boolean formulae. It performs both 
qualitative analysis (search of minimal cut sets) and 
quantitative one. OCAS, SIMFIA and COMBAVA are 
tools dedicated to mode automata models written in 
the AltaRica languages. They enable interactive 
model simulation, search of sequences of bounded 
length leading to a feared event, extraction of fault 
trees for static systems. In ISAAC project (see for 
more details [4: www.cert.fr/isaac/]), tools were also 
developed to inject failure modes inside Nu-SMV, 
Scade and Statechart models and then extract either 
fault tree or sequence of fault leading to a feared 
events. 
Similarly, the quantification of the probability of 
occurrence of a feared event will be computed 
thanks to a Boolean formula annotated by probability 
(e.g., by means of Aralia) or by stochastic simulation 
of an automata (e.g. COMBAVA) or by probabilistic 
model-checking (e.g. Prism model checker). 
Finally, the verification of the truth of some 
hypothesis can be performed by simulation or by 
proof (we mean here by “proof”, a rigorous 
exhaustive verification. It can be achieved in several 
ways such as by so-called model-checking 
technique). 
2.4. Relation with engineering models 
To perform the fault propagation analysis described 
in §2.3, the dependability engineer may use different 
types of system modelling and associated attributes, 
which level of details depends also on the current 
step in the dependability process. 
The input of this analysis is the Functional Hazard 
Analysis which is made at an upper level, generally 
by the customer, and which defines the system 
Failure Conditions with associated qualitative and 
quantitative requirements. 
In practical, the first task for building the “safety” 
system model is to identify the functional paths i.e., 
the chains of functional dependencies, related to 
each Failure Condition or Feared Event, by mapping 
these paths on the system functions and 
components. 
Modelling 
entities 
Attributes of 
entities 
Attributes of 
attributes 
Functional path Feared event Severity of 
feared event 
Function Involved 
functional path 
 
Involved 
functional path 
 Component 
Involved 
function 
 
 
The second step is the identification of interfaces 
between functions and equipment inside a same 
functional path, to express functional dependencies 
in the model: 
• Identification of inputs / outputs links between 
functional block or equipment, 
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• Identification of intrinsic architectural “safety 
barriers” (redundancies or monitoring). 
Note that this activity may be performed at various 
decomposition levels (systems, equipment, software 
or hardware elements). 
 
Modelling 
entities 
Attributes of 
entities 
Attributes of 
attributes 
Inputs Modes of input: 
valid and correct, 
valid and 
erroneous, invalid 
or lost … 
Outputs Modes of outputs: 
valid and correct, 
valid and 
erroneous, invalid 
or lost, … 
Function or 
Component 
Involved 
Safety barrier 
- Redundancy 
- Monitoring 
 
At this stage, the fault propagation model may be 
used for criticality analysis, by adding “criticality” 
attributes to the modelling entities (e.g. at function 
and component levels), which are defined from the 
initial feared event severity allocated to each 
functional path and thanks to the mapping functional 
path / functions / components and the identification 
of “safety barriers” involved in the functional path. 
 
Modelling 
entities 
Attributes of 
entities 
Function criticality of function 
Component criticality level 
Then, the “dependability” system model is expanded 
with a description of the component behaviour face 
to failures to constitute the analytical dependability 
model described in §2.3, which will be used for all 
the dysfunctional analysis mentioned in §2.2. 
 
Modelling 
entities 
Attributes of 
entities 
Attributes of 
attributes 
Failure modes - 
States (operative, 
faulty, …) 
- 
Function or 
Component 
Component 
behaviour 
- Relationship 
between inputs 
& outputs 
- Relationship 
between failure 
modes & states 
- Relationship 
between states 
& outputs 
 
In particular, specific quantitative attributes may be 
added to this fault propagation model, in order to 
perform the quantitative dependability analysis 
(basically FMEA for single failures, FTA for 
scenarios of multiple failures, etc) through the use of 
specific tools: 
 
Modelling 
entities 
Attributes of 
entities 
Attributes of 
attributes 
Failure mode - %Failure rate 
- Active or 
dormant failure 
mode 
- Detected in 
Built-In Test 
Failure rate - 
Component 
Testability 
characteristics 
- Type of test 
- Test 
activation time 
- generation of 
false alarms 
 
For the dependency analysis, a specific “common 
mode” attribute may be added to each component 
(e.g. potential common mode are related to: 
common design or technologies, common resources, 
common operational or maintenance tasks on 
several components, etc.), in order to validate the 
independence hypotheses between safety barriers. 
 
3. Case studies 
3.1. Quantitative analysis 
Using a simple digital output example, a draft 
workflow at the functional level is established. It 
illustrates the application of the failure rate attribute 
in the early architecture phase. The important 
features to be provided by engineering models are 
marked bold. 
Based on the system analysis, certain failure rates 
with specific failure modes are assigned to the digital 
output functionality DGO, labelled with '1' in the 
figure 1 below. E.g. this could be 5·10-6/h for the 
'detected loss' and 10-6/h for the 'undetected 
erroneous transmission'. 
Models shall support the annotation of the 
quantitative values and enable the user to define 
generic failure modes to be referenced in the 
further modelling activities. Each failure mode 
contains an attribute to quantify it’s by percent 
participation to the objects over all failure rate ('% of 
failure rate'). 
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Figure 1: DGO Functional description 
In the next step, the safety objective of the function 
is linked with the related and relevant sub-functions 
('2' in figure 1 above). Again additional dependability 
modelling facilities are required, to express 
relations between objects or functions in terms 
of RAMS dependencies. 
A two fold approach is used to elaborate a feasible 
architecture. On one side the primary objectives are 
refined to the resulting sub-function requirements. 
On the other side, failure mode specific failure rates 
are put on the sub-functions ('2'), based on 
experience, a data base or research. 
So models shall provide means to verify the 
quantitative breakdown of the dependability 
objectives by a bottom up assessment of the 
current architecture and sub-function property 
assumptions. 
In the next step failure mode specific barriers and 
monitoring functions ('3' in figure 2 below) are 
added and assessed as in the previous step. The 
applied measures are linked with the failure mode 
attribute they are designed to cope with. So models 
shall provide means to quantify the impact of 
monitoring functions on the failure mode 
detection and the failure rate coverage. 
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Figure 2: DGO Functional monitoring 
 
After links to the physical model have to be set 
(figure 3), since the deployment may introduce new 
failure modes, which have to be analysed, probably 
leading to new monitoring mechanisms. 
 
	

DGO 
Numeric
function
DGO
Peripheral
DGI
Feedback
Safety objectives : 
- detected loss
- undetected erroneous transmission
- etc…Physical model
Back    Board
C
P
U 
B
O
A
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D
D
G
I
B
O
A
R
D
D
G
O
B
O
A
R
D
List of Safety Monitoring/test
- feedback test : after power up
- etc…
 
Figure 3: Links between functional model and 
physical model 
 
Also relations between entities in the design 
models and dedicated dependability assessment 
models such as FTA or failure propagation 
models shall be supported. 
To conclude the results of the example work flow, 
engineering model based environments should 
provide a dependability tool bar in some diagrams 
and views, to ease the access to certain important 
dependability attributes and links. The process for 
the failure rate, failure mode and '% of failure rate' 
described above shall be extended and generalized 
to be applicable for all dependability attributes. 
Merging and linking design and dependability 
aspects makes dependability visible for the 
developers and helps to avoid inappropriate design 
choices by enabling an 'on the fly' assessment of the 
dependability attributes. 
 
3.2. Partitioning 
Partitioning is an important issue in system 
dependability. It is worth noting that partitioning may 
be seen from two complementary perspectives: 
• On the one hand partitioning is used to limit the 
impact of faults and the propagation of failures 
between different functions and components. In 
dependable systems some entities are protected 
by barriers. 
• On the other hand, partitioning enables 
dependability analyses. Only by restricting and 
knowing the relevant faults, that affect a function 
or component quantitative assessments such as 
failure rate estimations are possible. 
When looking at functions in general we try to 
reduce dependencies and want to get an overview 
how these entities contribute to some common 
failure conditions. The dependability engineer 
analyses, if a small number or events can cause 
multiple sub function failures which lead in their 
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summation to a critical system state. Barriers as 
means of partitioning are applied then to reduce the 
spread out of failures 
The partitioning of redundant functions is somehow a 
special case of the above. Redundancy is applied to 
cope with certain failures and to avoid their 
propagation into subsequent functions. In this case 
the technical implementation is given and the 
partitioning analysis is performed as a dependability 
justification. The dependability engineer is looking for 
common cause failures that bypass the redundancy 
and verifies the barriers. 
Partitioning may be represented as a logical 
separation between functions and pieces of 
software, as illustrated in figure 4. 
 

Hardware 
O/S + Drivers + Services 
 
 
 
 
Configu-
ration  
 
Table 
 
Function 
 
A 
 
Function 
 
B 
 
Function 
 
X 
 
Figure 4: Software Partitioning 
 
Partitioning may also correspond to a strictly 
enforced physical separation between different 
hardware entities, as illustrated in figure 5 on the 
example of the separation between the COM and 
MON channels in civil aircraft. 
 
Input validation 
and monitoring
Control law 
computation
Actuators 
command and
monitoring
Switching 
devices
Engagement and reconfiguration logicsA/C System
Sensors
COM
Input validation 
and monitoring
Control law 
computation
Actuators
monitoring
Switching 
devices
Engagement and reconfiguration logic
A/C system
sensors
MON
COM 
sensor
MON
sensor
Actuators
 
Figure 5: COM/MON Architecture 
 
An appropriate support to dependability analyses or 
partitioned systems should provide means to 
assign an “area of influence” to a fault / failure or 
the responsible failure mode of a function or 
component, so as to obtain a flexible method to 
describe the impact of failures. We can express and 
quantify independence in terms of several aspects 
• There are geometrical areas, which use 
distances to avoid failures with physical impact 
to propagate. The faults that we want to address 
may be e.g., over temperature, shock waves or 
leakage of critical liquids. 
• There are also logical physical areas, such as 
an independent power supply or short circuit 
failure isolation by galvanic decoupling. 
• Finally there are software considerations, e.g. 
the independence in terms of memory and 
scheduling. 
Many open questions remain to be answered in 
further research activities. Up to now it is not clear, 
for example, how these areas should be represented 
in models, especially how the relation and interaction 
with the standard design models may look like. 
 
 
4. Towards Model-based dependability 
engineering 
Embedded systems become more and more 
complex while their criticality increases due to their 
wider functional coverage. Consequently complex 
systems have to be designed to be fault tolerant, 
reliable and robust. More often, such critical systems 
shall also be proven dependable. The acceptance 
process depends on the application domain 
(aeronautic, space, automotive, nuclear power 
station, etc.). The certification processes are 
periodically updated in order to better fit the 
evolutions of technologies (IMA, smart sensors and 
actuators ...) or development process (model based 
design, use of COTS, open-source software ...). In 
the aeronautic field, major documents (e.g., 
ARP4754, DO178B, ARP4761) are currently under 
revision. In a similar way, for automotive field, ISO 
WD 26262 is in progress. 
Today we find a layered process, starting with some 
preliminary and abstract design studies and ending 
with the validation of the product, e.g. an embedded 
device. All stages of this well known V-cycle typically 
make use of different methods and tools to perform 
the required tasks. In the last years more and more 
modelling techniques were introduced to offer a 
common platform for all the lifecycle activities. 
Models provide the ability to successively refine a 
draft design and to enter the coding and verification 
phases seamlessly. 
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A common concern is to adapt the certification 
processes in order to reduce their cost whilst 
covering new practices. The following points 
highlight some difficulties.  
Sometimes, the certification objectives are over-
specified. This induces unnecessary cost and may 
lead to discard the use of innovative product in 
embedded systems. For instance, in DO178B, levels 
of test coverage are recommended according to the 
software criticality level. This mean of compliance is 
costly and prohibit the use of some COTS whereas it 
would be better to clarify the expected product 
properties. 
Another problem is the definition of a homogenous 
approach concerning dependability and safety. 
There are engineering models and safety or 
dependability related models. Each of them is 
evolving over several design phases from very 
abstract content to complex systems. There is no 
guidance, what dependability features should be 
modelled and how to integrate them efficiently in the 
engineering models, and advise when to add some 
qualitative and quantitative dependability arguments 
and how to combine and assess them is missing. 
We do not know exactly how to make use of these 
arguments among different design or abstraction 
levels. It turned out to be necessary to improve the 
binding between different dependability assessment 
and analysis methods in the development process. 
Finally, it becomes harder and longer to assess 
complex integrated systems with traditional 
compliance means.  Thus it is also interesting to 
enhance existing assessment techniques or define 
alternative ones in order to cope more efficiently 
both with emerging certification objectives, current 
development process and increasing system 
complexity. 
The following axes for further work can be identified: 
• With focus on dependability objectives such as 
test generation, robustness analysis, reliability 
evaluation and the handling of safety properties, 
we want to improve the assessment of 
dependability properties using a model based 
process. We must therefore provide the answers 
to the following questions: 
o Which attributes have to be added in which 
design phase? How to analyze abstract 
models of early design phases? 
o What are the features to be assessed by 
these attributes and which are the methods 
to be used? Are they qualitative or 
quantitative? How to merge them? 
o How are these attributes broken down from 
one design level to the next? 
o How do different model types, like 
engineering or dependability oriented 
models interact to assess dependability? 
This latter item should give some hints, where it 
is useful to extend standard modelling 
languages like UML with new attributes and 
where it might be useful to introduce and link 
specialized modelling languages with 
strengthens on dependability modelling. 
• Robustness may be defined as a specialized 
dependability attribute, characterizing a system 
reaction with respect to external threats. 
Accordingly, robustness testing involves testing 
a system in the presence of faults or stressful 
environmental conditions. It may be performed 
for verification purposes (e.g., to check whether 
a property is preserved despite the threats) or 
for evaluation purposes (e.g., to characterize the 
failure modes of a component, or to assess the 
efficacy of protection mechanisms).  
Robustness testing is expected to deserve more 
and more attention, including in the case of 
embedded systems. Design paradigms based 
on reusable, off-the-shelf components makes it 
necessary to assess and consolidate the 
robustness of such components. At the system 
level, the deployment of critical autonomous 
embedded systems, having to perform their 
mission in spite of fault occurrence, also 
imposes heavy robustness constraints. Finally, 
the growing trend to interconnection and 
distribution further reinforce the uncertain, or 
even malicious (e.g., external attackers), 
characteristics of the environment of computer 
systems.  
The aim of the proposal is to investigate rigorous 
test strategies for addressing robustness 
concerns, which raises a number of issues: 
o Modelling approaches may need to be 
enriched to specifically account for the 
robustness concern. Usage profiles, fault 
models are to be made explicit at various 
abstraction levels; 
o From a methodological viewpoint, existing 
development processes need to be analyzed 
to identify the steps to be consolidated by 
robustness analysis. The use of model-
based simulation might allow early validation 
in some cases, or may provide requirements 
for further testing at later steps; 
o From a technical viewpoint, there is a need 
for research on systematic ways of selecting 
the “inputs” (including the fault dimension), 
as well as on how to concretely apply them 
to a target system. The relevant methods 
and tools should build on both the fault 
injection technology and the software testing 
one. 
 
• Contribution of methods and their combinations 
to SW dependability assessment: In most 
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domains, the incorporation of software in critical 
systems is largely based on a generic approach 
where an abstraction of dependability 
requirements is elaborated as an ordered set of 
criticality levels, and software assurance means 
are used accordingly, corresponding to an 
ordered set of development and validation 
requirements. The problem we propose to 
investigate concerns the definition of the 
contents of the assurance levels, put in front of 
each criticality level i.e., the definition and 
justification of the sets of software dependability 
objectives and constraints, with associated 
means (methods, techniques and their possible 
combinations). This involves an assessment of 
software dependability means combining the 
complementary skills and experience of both 
academic and industrial partners, exploiting 
both: 
o analytical assessment of various software 
dependability approaches (combining 
objective assessment when possible and 
engineer judgement), 
o lessons-learnt in particular from 
dependability properties actually observed 
whenever available and their possible 
relationships to identified software 
assurance means. 
 
• Particular focus should be put, first on model-
based approaches (assurance approaches for 
"model-based-engineered-software", as well as 
"model-based-assurance approaches"), second 
on advanced approaches that could be 
proposed for COTS software. 
 
• Secondary (though important) objectives might 
be to investigate the very nature of the claim 
supported by a criticality-based approach, and 
whether it can be rigorously expressed. Such a 
rigorous (or at least, clear enough) expression is 
expected to provide fruitful bases for e.g.,: 
o additional support to the sound definition of 
assurance means for each criticality level, 
o support to the definition of a sound approach 
to allocate criticality levels along the 
definition of a system, 
o support to the sound incorporation of the 
dependability claims related to software 
(based on the criticality-based approach) 
into the global set of system level 
dependability claims. 
5. Summary 
The work reported in this paper aims at analysing 
how to integrate dependability analyses within a 
seamless process adapted to model-based 
engineering approaches. 
In a first step we analysed the entities addressed by 
current dependability analysis techniques, and 
established requirements towards model-based 
engineering process and tools so as to appropriately 
support these analyses. 
However dependability analyses may also benefit 
more directly from model-based approaches. We 
have therefore identified a set of proposals on which 
partners are now engaged towards efficient 
integrated model-based dependability engineering. 
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7. Glossary 
AADL: Architecture Analysis and Design Language 
COTS: Commercial Off-the-shelf 
DGI: Digital Input 
DGO: Digital output  
FMEA: Failure Modes and Effects Analysis 
FTA: Fault Tree Analysis 
HAZOP: Hazard and Operability analysis 
IMA: Integrated Modular Architecture  
TOPCASED: Toolkit in OPen-source for Critical 
Application and SystEms development 
UML: Unified Modelling Language 
 
 
